The present paper investigates the reaction of common stock returns to rating changes: it is the first empirical evidence for the Italian case. The analysis focuses on a sample of 299 rating actions announced by Fitch, Moody's and Standard&Poor's with respect to Italian firms in the period January 1991 -August 2003. Rating changes announcement are classified according to the their direction (i.e. upgrades versus downgrades), their anticipation (i.e. rating actions following additions to a credit watch list), the presence of concurrent news, the reason of the rating action, the sector of the issuer. Additions to credit watch lists were also examined as separate events.
Introduction
Recent defaults by two majors Italian corporations have led to a fierce debate about the role of rating agencies. One view points out that regulators could rely on ratings as an instrument of information and protection of small investors; an alternative view underlines that rating agencies move slowly and therefore that the information content of their judgements is poor.
Beyond the domestic issues, it is well known that the regulatory framework proposed by the Basel Committee assigns a central role to external ratings in the calculation of banks' regulatory capital under the so called standardised approach. Therefore, investigation of the information content of ratings is a central topic to the financial market regulators.
This paper tries to assess the impact on stock prices of rating changes for a sample of 299 rating actions involving Italian listed companies in the interval spanning from the 1 st of January 1991 till the 31 st of August 2003. Rating changes include both upgrades and downgrades, as well as credit watches (both positive and negative). Abnormal returns for stock prices are estimated, controlling for the expected versus the unexpected rating changes, contaminating information published before the rating action, the sector of the rated firm (i.e. banks and insurance companies versus corporations), the reason which prompted the rating action. Rating watches have been used both to discriminate between expected and unexpected rating changes as well as events themselves.
The motivation for the paper comes from the previous empirical evidence, mainly concerning the United States, according to which rating agencies provide little if any new information to the market, but rather reflect information which has already been incorporated in market prices.
A further motivation comes from the fact that there are no studies using Italian data for the assessment of the impact of rating actions on stock prices. This is also due to the modest penetration of ratings in Italy, as well as in many other European countries.
Therefore, a test for a specific European country may be a useful sensitivity check to the earlier research mainly involving U.S. data; moreover, it may provide insights for financial markets regulators which may want to assess the use of external ratings as a regulatory tool.
Consistently with the previous empirical evidence, overall results on the announcements effects of rating changes indicate that weak nega tive abnormal returns are associated with downgrades in the event window ranging from the day before till the day after the announcement; as far as concerns upgrades, significant positive abnormal returns arise after the rating change, thus signalling a delay in market reaction to positive news. In both cases, no preannouncement effect is detected. Expected rating changes (i.e. preceded by watches) lead to a greater price impact than unexpected ones; similarly, announcements preceded by contaminating information result in statistically significant abnormal returns which are greater than those corresponding to uncontaminated rating actions: this might provide evidence that the stock price reaction is mainly due to the contaminating information rather than to the rating action itself. Downgrades lead to a greater impact for banks and insurance companies; also the reason of the rating change seems to matters only for downgrades.
Similar evidence is obtained when the analysis is undertaken on the subsample of additions to the watch list.
The work is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the conclusions of the previous literature on the impact of rating actions; section 3 posits a few questions which are to be investigated in the paper; the following paragraph describes the data and the methodology used; section 5 comments the results; conclusions follow.
Previous literature
The information content of ratings can be examined by focussing on the stock and bond price impact of rating changes. If age ncies act on the basis of information which is not already in the public domain, we would expect to find significant abnormal returns associated with rating changes (as computed with reference to the day of the announcement or to a [-1, +1] event window). Testing for abnormal returns over longer pre-and post-announcement periods may also be very useful: detection of a pre-announcement effect, for instance, supports the conclusion that agencies merely react to news already embedded in market prices.
Early studies on the effect of rating changes, using either monthly or daily data for the U.S. bond market, found either mixed evidence (Pinches and Singleton, 1978) or no impact at all (Weinstein, 1977) . In particular, the sample analysed in Weinstein (1977) included about two thirds of rating actions which followed publicly known events, thus revealing an adaptive behaviour by rating agencies which has been pointed out also by later researches.
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Recent evidence concerning the U.S. market partially diverges from the conclusions mentioned above. Hand et al. (1992) , after breaking down the rating actions into different subgroups according to whether they were preceded by a watch list and/or by contaminating information and to whether they were expected by the market, find out that only negative watches and downgrades lead to a significant effect on both bond and stock prices and that the uncontaminated sample exhibited stronger reactions; this result is however unambiguous only for the group of the unexpected rating actions, the evidence being otherwise quite mixed. Goh and Ederington (1993) argue that downgrades may have a different impact on stock prices depending on the reason which led to an increase in the firm's risk and, in particular, on whether such an increase corresponds to a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. The authors actually find a significant negative market reaction only to downgrades due to a deterioration of firm's financial prospects which have negative implications for stockholders. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) check also for post-announcement drift by investigating the price impact along a three-year horizon. D owngrades and upgrades are broken up into two subsamples depending on whether they relate to holding or subsidiaries. The authors find that only downgrades matter: they exhibit a post-announcement effect lasting at least one year and being more pronounced for holdings as well as for small firms and for lower rated firms.
A stream of the literature investigates the impact of rating changes specifically for banks 2 . Schweitzer et al. (1992) test the hypothesis that rating actions may matter less for banks than for corporates, the idea being that since banks are highly regulated entities the amount of information available to the market is higher and hence the information content of rating actions is lower. On the other hand, if regulators allow withholding of adverse information in view of the preservation of the stability of the banking system, the abnormal returns associated with unfavourable bank rating actions may be more pronounced that those for industrial firms. The empirical evidence lends support to the second hypothesis, since downgrades lead to a stronger effect when involving banks. Gropp and Richards (2001) assess the impact of rating changes on stock and bond prices for a sample of European banks. They find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, while for stock prices strong effects are associated with unexpected rating changes; moreover, the underlying reason seems to matter for the subsample of downgrades only. The authors conclude that their overall results suggest that rating agencies may perform a useful role in summarising and providing information at least to stockholders.
A very interesting study provides an explanation for the asymmetric reaction on market prices associated with downgrades and upgrades (that is, significantly negative for the former and insignificant for the latter; Vassalou and Xing, 2003) . Using the same sample as in Dichev and Piotroski (2001) , Vassalou and Xing compute and analyse the pattern of the default likelihood probability (DLI) within the window spanning from 36 months before to 36 months afterwards the rating action. The asymmetric reaction to rating cha nges seems to be led by an asymmetric pattern of the DLI: this indicator would move sharply only before downgrade announcements (by rising before and gradually decreasing in the following years), while it would follow a less pronounced pattern before upgrades. Moreover, the authors argue that the ranking of the firms resulting from rating can be easily obtained by using indicators such as dimension or book to market value: therefore, the information content of ratings would be poor.
In spite of the mixed evidence on the information content of ratings, a few authors argue that rating agencies produce valuable complementary information, which would also provide a useful tool for market discipline: this in turn may improve the corporate governance of the rated entities.
The Hypothesis
The empirical evidence recalled above indicated a few key factors which need to be taken account when investigating the information content of rating changes.
First, the rating actions may produce a differential impact o n asset prices according to whether they are upgrades, downgrades or watches.
Expected changes, anticipated by a watch or an outlook notice, might impact less than unexpected ones.
Contaminating news, which lead into the public domain the event prompting the following rating action, might be associated with a lower announcement effect.
The impact of the rating action might also depend on the sector of the issuer: therefore, it is interesting to split observations according to whether they refer to a financial firm or to an industrial firm.
Finally, the explanation of the rating changes might be relevant: a differential impact might arise depending on whether the underlying reason is a change in the firm's earnings or in the firm's leverage.
The present paper will therefore try to investigate the following questions for a sample of rating actions involving Italian issuers:
1) Do stock prices react differently to downgrades versus upgrades?
2) Do stock prices react differently to expected downgrades/upgrades versus unexpected rating actions?
3) Do stock prices react differently to contaminated downgrades/upgrades versus uncontaminated rating actions? 4) Do stock prices react differently depending on the sector of the issuer involved in the rating action? 5) Do stock prices react differently depending on the reason of the rating action?
Questions 1-3 have also been investigated with reference to additions to the watch list.
Data and methodology

4.1
The data The data set includes 299 rating actions performed in the period 1 st Januray 1991 -31 st August 2003 by Fitch/IBCA, Moody's and Standard&Poor's. The sample was compiled by combining the information provided by the Bloomberg database with the information provided by the rating agencies websites; this combina tion was also employed to subdivide the observations into three groups, depending on the reason underlying the rating change (more on this later). The Bloomberg database was also used to check whether the rating announcement followed a public news.
The analysis concentrated on long term issuer ratings, that is on the agencies' opinion of an obligor's overall financial capacity to pay its financial obligations. Moreover, the analysis focussed on the effect on stock rather than bond prices for two reasons. First, for most of the firms only the issuer rating is available; therefore, selecting only issue ratings would have severely restricted the sample size. Secondly, regardless of the sample size, it is well known that Italian and European bond markets are thin and illiquid; considering bond ratings might have implied incurring in a poor data quality problem.
Rating actions are distributed as follows: Among the downgrades, 7 rating actions implied the passage from the investment grade to the speculative category; among the upgrades, the category change took place just once. In 57 cases (corresponding to 26 rating changes), the action was undertaken by two or more agencies within a time span no longer than one week: apart from one circumstance, rating changes were always converging (that is, they moved in the same direction). Finally, agencies changed ratings by two notches at most in almost all the cases.
Most of the rating actions involves banks (200 against the 30 concerning insurance companies and the 69 concerning industrial firms; Tab. 3); this distribution reflects the penetration of rating by the sector of issuers that, as mentioned above (Tab. 2), is mainly the banking sector.
Table 3 about here
The breakdown of the rating actions by year shows that the frequency of the rating actions increased greatly over time (Tab. 4): Table 4 about here Rating actions were subdivided according to whether they were anticipated, either by the addition to the watch list or by the release of an outlook: given this criterion, about 70% of the downgrades and about 48% of the up grades were classified as expected; overall, 143 events are classified as expected. 3 In the analysis, the observations corresponding to a watch removal were classified either as an upgrade or as a downgrade depending on whether the previous watch was negative or positive. The observations corresponding to the evolving watch were not regarded as an event on themselves but rather were used to define the following rating change as expected.
The presence of a concurring disclosure makes the rating action contaminated: in our sample, 188 rating actions were considered contaminated. Among the expected events (amounting to 143), 100 are anticipated by a press story about the reason underlying the rating change. Disregarding this evidence might have led to a biased estimation of the effect of rating announcements on stock prices; excluding contaminated observations, however, might be inappropriate especially whether the firm's disclosure was prompted by the expectation of a rating action. Therefore, in the following the announcement effects will also be computed and compared for the subsamples of contaminated and uncontaminated events.
The reason motivating the rating action was also taken into account. Following Goh and Ederington (1993) , observations were split into three groups: the first including an improvement/deterioration of the firm's earnings, financial prospects and cash flows which might be due either to firm's specific events or to institutional/macroeconomic factors; the second linked to events which change the firm's leverage, such as mergers and acquisitions; the third including miscellaneous reasons (Tab. 5).
4 Table 5 about here
The methodology
Abnormal returns associated with rating actions have been computed through the application of t he standard Event Study Methodology. After setting the announcement day as day 0, a market model was run using the window [-260, -21] as the estimation period, according to the following specification:
where R it is the log return of the stock i at time t, R M is the log return of the market portfolio m at time t.
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The estimated parameters have been used to compute abnormal return in the event window [-20, + 20 ] : 
Results
In the following, results of the estimation of abnormal returns are reported for both the subsample of upgrades/downgrades and the subsample including watches only.
Upgrades and downgrades
Results in Tabb. 6 and 7 allow to answer positively to the first hypothesis to be investigated: upgrades and downgrades affect differently stock prices and such difference is statistically significant.
The abnormal returns (AAR) on rating change announcement on day 0 (the event day) and on day 1 are reported in tab. 6. Interestingly, the AAR on the event day are always statistically insignificant, while on day 1 they turn out to be significantly different from zero for both downgrades and upgrades when the whole sample is considered (equal respectively to -0.47 and +0.51%).
In the event window [-1, +1 ] only Car for downgrades are statistically significant although tiny (-0.62% versus +0.58%). No significant abnormal return is found in the pre announcement windows; only upgrades exhibit a post announcement drift, which might signal a phenomenon of market under-reaction (more precisely, 1.84% and 0.94% in the windows [+2, +10] and [+11, +20] respectively).
Table 6 and 7 about here
As far as concerns the breakdown of expected versus unexpected rating changes, the AAR are significantly different from zero at day 1 only for the sample of the expected rating actions (-0.59% for the subsample of downgrades and +0.75% for the sample of upgrades; see Tab. 6).
The stock price effect of rating actions in the window [-1, +1] turns out to be higher for those anticipated by a watch notice, which are also the only ones statistically significant: more precisely, Cars amount to -0.72% for expected downgrades and to +0.82% for expected upgrades (versus -0,41% and +0.04% recorded for unexpected events; see Tab. 7). The only exception comes from the positive abnormal returns estimated for the upgrades in the window [+2 +10]: the expected rating actions show a Car equal to 1.17% versus the unexpected rating action Car equal to 3.36%. These results are consistent with the evidence for the U.S. market, but are different from that recorded by Gropp and Richards (2001) involving a sample of European banks. The authors find out that, after splitting observations not only into expected versus unexpected changes but also into subgroups according to the reason of the change, for a few cases expected rating actions affect stock prices less that unexpected ones. Therefore, following these authors, Cars were computed for the different subsamples of observations. Although most of these subsamples are too small for statistical inference, for downgrades the underlying reason turned out to be relevant. In particular, when the negative change is driven by the deterioration of the fir m's earning prospects, Cars are greater (and statistically significant) only for the group of unexpected rating actions. Apart from this check, it is worth to notice that the significance of the abnormal returns of expected events only may in part be explained by the relatively low number of unexpected events (which amounts to less that 50% of the expected ones both in the subsample of upgrades and of downgrades), but also by the fact that most of the expected rating actions are anticipated by a concurrent disclosure (more precisely, 100 out of 143).
The concurrent disclosure might have driven the results just described: this hypothesis is indirectly supported also by the fact that, as shown by the evidence got by comparing contaminated and uncontaminated subsamples, news contamination seem to matter. Almost always, both downgrades and upgrades (although with reference to different temporal windows) exhibit higher Cars for rating actions anticipated by the announcement and/or a press speculation on the event which prompted the agency's action. In particular, for contaminated downgrades the Car[-1, +1] and the Car[+2,+10] are higher than those of the uncontaminated events and are also the only ones significant (Car[-1, +1] is equal to -0.94%, versus -0.19%). For contaminated upgrades, statistically significant abnormal returns are recorded in the two post announcement windows, but for Car[+2,+10] uncontaminated upgrades show a stronger price impact (+2.46% versus +1.33%); this result, however is reversed in the following time interval when Car[+11,+20] turns out to be the highest and the only one statistically significant. Overall, these results might imply that stock prices are affected mainly by the news in the public domain and preceding the rating change rather than the rating change itself. The evidence on the AAR, however, is not clear cut: at day 1, the abnormal returns corresponding to downgrades are statistically different from zero only for the contaminated subsample ( -0.78%), but the abnormal returns corresponding to upgrades are statistically different from zero only for the uncontaminated sample (+0.63%; see Tab. 6).
The impact of rating changes seems to be different depending on the sector of the issuer only for downgrades (Tabb. 6 and 8). The results show a Car [-1 +1] which is lower for financial than for industrial firms: however only the former, equal to -0.48% versus -0.99%, is statistically significant. This might be due in part to the relatively lower number of events related to industrial firm (29 versus 78): this evidence may not therefore be regarded as conclusive.
Table 8 about here
As to the reason of the rating action, it seems to matter only for downgrades given that the abnormal negative returns are statistically significant for the "mergers and acquisitions" subsample ( -1.07% in the window [-1, +1]). It is important to recall that this subsample mainly includes rating actions which are contamined by concurring news and announcements and that, therefore, given the evidence found for the contaminated versus the uncontaminated groups, the price reaction might be led primarily by the news.
Rating watches
As mentioned above, rating watches are used not only to discriminate between expected and unexpected rating actions but also as events themselves. The analysis described in the previous paragraph was therefore replicated for the addition to a watch list. Again, the results are consistent with the evidence drawn for other countries (Tab. 9).
Table 9 about here
In particular, only n egative rating watches exhibit a significant Car (equal to -1,34%) in the window [-1, +1]; moreover negative watches which are preceded by concurring information are associated with a higher price impact (about -2.7% against -1.5% for the uncontaminated subsample). Again, this latter result might strengthen the inference that stock prices react basically to the public announcement of the event underlying the rating action rather than to the rating change itself. Given the small sample size (19 events), however, this conclusion might not be regarded as robust. Moreover, given that also the uncontaminated subsample shows a Car[-1, +1] which is also statistically and quantitatively significant, negative watches might be regarded as conveying information to the market in any case.
Finally, it is worth noticing that within the sample of agencies' actions implying bad news for the rated firms, stock prices seem to react more to negative watches than to downgrades.
Conclusions
The analysis of the effects on stock prices of rating actions for a sample of rating changes announcements by Fitch, Moody's and Standard&Poor's showed significant average excess returns in the event window only for additions to the negative credit watch list and for actual downgrades. The former show a stronger impact than the latter (respectively, -1.3% and -0.6%). Additions to positive credit watch list and upgrades show statistically significant and positive abnormal returns after the event window. These evidence is consistent wit h the results found by the previous literature.
Expected rating actions, anticipated by additions to credit watch or by an outlook notice, exhibit a greater impact on market prices than unexpected ones: this is quite in contrast with the evidence recorded by the previous research. Such result may in part be explained by the relatively low number of unexpected events (which amounts to less that 50% of the expected ones both in the subsample of upgrades and of downgrades), but also by the fact that most of the expected rating actions are anticipated by a concurrent disclosure. Contaminated events are in fact associated with a higher stock price reaction: this result, which holds both for downgrades and upgrades, lends support to the conclusion that price movements are mainly driven by parallel news rather than by the rating action itself.
The impact of rating changes seems to be different depending on the sector of the issuer only for downgrades: in particular, negative abnormal returns are significant and lower for financial than for industrial firms. Also the reason of the rating action seems to matter only for downgrades, when mergers and acquisitions lead to a price effect which is higher than that recorded for the other subsamples. Again, it is worth to notice that this subsample mainly includes contaminated rating actions that, therefore, given the evidence found for the contaminated versus the uncontaminated groups, the price reaction might be led primarily by the concurrent disclosure.
The analysis for the subsample of additions to the credit watch list confirms the evidence drawn for the actual rating changes, by showing asymmetric results with respect to negative and positive watches and by exhibiting a higher price reaction for the events associated with concurrent disclosure.
Overall, stock price reactions to rating change announcements are quite moderate or statistically insignificant. The results show that the market may acknowledge an information content to rating actions only for downgrades and additions to negative credit watch. If any, the abnormal returns seem to be driven mainly by concurrent disclosure concerning the reason underlying the rating action. The striking result is, however, the absence of pre-announcement abnormal returns eve n for the contaminated subsample: this might be an indirect evidence of a timely action of the rating agencies when they move on the basis of a news which is already in the public domain.
On a policy grounds, the main implication is that ratings cannot be thought as a fundamental tool for the investor protection: rather, they may strengthen other measures primarily adopted by financial markets regulators, such as effective rules of corporate governance, transparency and rules of conduct of the intermediaries. 
